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1. Th e traditional problem
Tim Crane, in his excellent Stanford en-
cyclopaedia entry, sums up the tradition-
al problem of perception in a sentence: 
“Th e structure of the problem is simple: 
perception seems intuitively to be open-
ness to the world, but this fact of open-
ness is threatened by refl ection on illu-
sions and hallucinations” (Crane 2005, 
section 1.1). Th e dialectic of the debate 
then is supposed to begin with the thesis 
that perceptual experience1 is essentially 
world-involving or “relational” because 
this is just how perceptual experience 
“seems intuitively”. Th e debate gets going 
when this natural idea is challenged by 
philosophical arguments, based on the 
possibility of hallucination or illusion, 
promoting the antithetical idea that per-
ceptual experience cannot be essentially 
world-involving. I want to consider what 
exactly the phrase “seems intuitively” is 
supposed to mean here, because I think 
that there is a tempting-but-wrong way 
1 I will stick to considering visual experience 
throughout this essay.
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to understand the claim that perceptual experience “seems” to be essentially world-
involving.
Consider the following passage from Mike Martin, where he claims that the relational 
account of perceptual experience:
“… is put forward on the grounds that it gives an accurate description of how 
the subject’s situation strikes her when consciously perceiving. For example, at 
present I can see the Genoa lighthouse. Focusing on the tower, I can note its 
distinctive shape and colouring; turning my attention inward, and refl ecting 
on the character of my looking at the tower, I can note that the tower does not 
disappear from the centre of my attention. Th e tower is not replaced by some 
surrogate, whose existence is merely internal to my mind… in its very conscious 
and so subjective character, the experience seems literally to include the world.” 
(Martin 1997, 84)
Th is passage is instructive as it contains hints of both the right way and the wrong way 
to understand the naturalness of the relational conception of experience. At the start 
of the passage Martin claims that the relational account is an “accurate description” 
of how a perceptual situation “strikes” the subject. What is the meaning of “strikes” 
here? Well, in the next sentence Martin glosses this by saying that the subject is to 
be envisaged as turning their attention inwards and refl ecting on the character of the 
experience. Prima facie, this sounds like two distinct mental actions: turning atten-
tion inwards and then also refl ecting upon the character of whatever this inward turn 
has revealed. But when we get to the end of the passage we are told that the apparent 
world-involving-ness of the experience is part of the very subjective character of the 
experience. Th is suggests that whether or not we choose to refl ect or think about it, the 
very phenomenology of perceptual experience is itself such as to be apparently world-
involving.
Th ere are two ideas here:
NATURALNESS IDEA 1) Th e most natural/intuitive conception of, or way of thinking 
about, our visual experience is as an instance of being consciously confronted with the 
world itself. 
NATURALNESS IDEA 2) Th e nature of our visual phenomenology itself is such as 
to be apparently world-involving – that is, the essential nature of our visual phenom-
enology is “presentational”; phenomenology is essentially as of the presentation of the 
mind-independent environment.
A comparison might help to clarify this distinction: we naturally conceive of our own 
visual experience as relying in some way on anatomical structures (of some kind) in-
side our eyes. Th is is surely a correct “folk-theory” about visual experience. But the 
nature of visual phenomenology itself is not such as to indicate anything about the 
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insides of one’s eyes. Visual experience itself does not appear reliant on the inner work-
ings of the eye. Were someone to doubt that the innards of eyes had anything to do 
with visual experience we could not allay their doubt by getting them to pay attention 
to their own visual phenomenology. In contrast, visual experience surely does appear 
to involve awareness of colour – were someone to doubt this, we would try to direct 
their attention to their own experience.
If we advance the fi rst idea, our complaint against sense-data theories will be that they 
go against our natural conception of perceptual experience, they require us to aban-
don deeply held, intuitive beliefs about the nature of experience. And for their part, 
sense-data theorists have generally been happy to concede that their position is indeed 
revisionary with respect to our natural, pre-philosophical views or conceptions about 
experience. 
But if we advance the second idea then our complaint against sense-data theories will 
be rather diff erent. Now we are claiming that sense-data theories go against the very 
phenomenological character of experience itself. Th is complaint is that the sense-
data theory does not do justice to the manifest phenomenology of the experiences it 
is supposed to be accounting for. Putting matters another way, the complaint is that 
sense-data theorists must be committed to the view that the very nature of our visual 
phenomenology is systematically misleading about itself for this phenomenology es-
sentially suggests that experience is world involving when, according to the sense-data 
theorist, it is not. Even if this second complaint were correct, it would not necessarily 
be a decisive blow against sense-data theories. A sense-data theorist might be happy to 
concede that the real nature of experience is not the way that it introspectively seems. 
But I will argue that sense-data theorists need not make this concession and should 
reject this second type of complaint against them2.
A well-known passage from Strawson advances the second idea:
“Mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as, in Kantian phrase, 
an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us… the human 
commitment to a conceptual scheme of a realist character is not properly 
described, even in a stretched sense of the words, as a theoretical commitment. 
It is, rather, something given with the given.” (Strawson 1979, 47)
Strawson claims that the apparent world-involving-ness of experience is something 
“given with the given”; that perceptual experience “presents itself” as world-involving, 
rather than this world-involving nature being any kind of “theoretical commitment”.
2 I might add that I have no wish to defend sense-data theories per se. My aim is only to clarify the nature of the 
dialectic here and clarify how we think of visual phenomenology.
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Th at these two N-ideas can easily get run together is illustrated by Crane’s Stanford 
Encyclopaedia entry. When setting up the dialectic, Crane writes of the arguments 
from illusion and hallucination that their conclusions aim to show that “perceptual ex-
perience cannot be what we intuitively think it is”. Th is, I take it, is the fi rst N-idea. But 
then two paragraphs later Crane writes that the conclusions of such arguments “con-
fl ict [with] the manifest nature of perception, as it is from the phenomenological point 
of view”. Th is, it seems to me, is now the second N-idea. Crane has, I’m suggesting, 
equivocated over the notion of the way experience “intuitively seems” – sometimes he 
means the way it is natural/intuitive to think about and conceive of our visual expe-
rience/phenomenology, at other times he means to describe the nature of our visual 
phenomenology itself, prior to any cognitive reaction we might have to it.
Basically, I want to argue that N-IDEA 1 is legitimate but N-IDEA 2 is not; however 
there will be a few complications and, I hope, points of interest along the way.
2. Transparency
Th e idea that when we try to direct our attention at our own visual experience3 we are 
bound to discover phenomenology that, in some sense of “seems”, seems to be the pre-
sentation of external mind-independent features is oft en labelled “the Transparency 
of experience”. It is common to distinguish two strengths of transparency claim, weak 
and strong, but I think it is just as important to distinguish between notions of trans-
parency understood according to either N-IDEA 1 or N-IDEA 2. Lets consider weak/
strong fi rst4.
Consider again the Strawson passage; the claim being made is that when we pay atten-
tion to our visual experience as a whole, an adequate description of the phenomenol-
ogy is bound to mention the apparent presentation of mind-independent items. Now 
compare an equally oft -quoted passage from Harman:
Uvuci s obje strane
“Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to the intrinsic features of your visual ex-
perience. I predict that you will fi nd that the only features there to turn your attention 
to will be features of the presented tree…” (Harman 1990, 39, my italics)
3 Th ere are, of course, many diffi  cult issues surrounding how to understand the act of introspection, or paying 
attention to experience. Indeed, these seem to me to be some of the hardest issues in the philosophy of mind. 
To mention just two basic options: one might conceive of introspecting visual experience as being just the act 
of thinking about some aspect of that experience. Or, one might conceive of introspection in terms of a genuine 
“inner sense” thought of in some quasi-perceptual fashion. But these are issues for any candidate theory of experi-
ence.
4 Strictly speaking, strong transparency claims of the form: every x is F, will only imply weak transparency claims 
of the form: some x’s are F, if it is assumed that there is at least one x. Given that x here ranges over phenomenal 
features of experience this seems a fair assumption.
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Th e claim being made here is stronger than Strawson’s claim. Harman is saying that 
there is nothing more to pay attention to in one’s visual phenomenology other than the 
apparently mind-independent objects and properties.
WEAK PHENOMENAL TRANSPARENCY (WPT): If we pay attention to the phe-
nomenology of visual experience, there are bound to be some elements/features whose 
essential phenomenological nature is as of mind-independent features.
STRONG PHENOMENAL TRANSPARENCY (SPT): If we pay attention to the phe-
nomenology of visual experience, every element/feature we could discover will be, in 
its essential phenomenological nature, as of mind-independent features.5
I will just briefl y mention the most obvious counter-example to SPT. Th e obvious ob-
jection to Strong transparency is simply that one can in fact discover or pay atten-
tion to features of visual phenomenology that are not environmental features. And 
the most commonly cited purported example of this is blurriness of vision – when I 
remove my glasses my visual phenomenology changes, things look blurry. And it is 
argued that this blurriness is a phenomenal feature that is not even apparently a fea-
ture of the environment – it doesn’t look like the world itself has suddenly blurred (see 
Crane, 2006). I don’t want to pursue this issue any further here and so I’ll just state the 
obvious point that WPT appears easier to defend in as much as it is not open to such 
counter-examples.
How do these transparency theses WPT and SPT relate to the two N-ideas distin-
guished in the previous section? WPT and SPT are two diff erent strength versions of 
N-IDEA2: that the nature of visual phenomenology in itself is as of world-presenta-
tion. WPT claims that any visual experience will have some such presentational phe-
nomenology, SPT claims that all visual phenomenology is presentational. Both are 
claims that mere attention/introspection, without any theorising or inferring, reveals 
phenomena that purport to be mind-independent. Th is is supposedly a theory-neutral 
datum that any theory of visual experience should try to account for. Reading the fol-
lowing passage from Crane, one might understand the phrase “experience seems” in 
this way:
“…all (or almost all) serious theories of perception agree that our perceptual 
experience seems as if it were an awareness of a mind-independent world. 
One’s awareness of the objects of a perceptual experience does not seem to be 
5 I have formulated these Transparency claims so as to be acceptable to both intentionalist and Naively-direct 
theorists. Both of these schools of thought typically claim that transparency is a property of visual experience 
and that their own theory is well placed to account for this transparency. But, of course, they account for it in 
very diff erent ways: the intentionalists will claim that phenomenology is partially or wholly constituted (in some 
sense of “constituted”) by the representational content of the experience, content that the environment is some 
way. Whereas the naïve/direct theorist claims that phenomenology is, at least partially, constituted by the mind-
independent environment itself being present to, or confronting, the conscious mind.
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an awareness of things which depend on that experience for their existence.” 
(Crane 2005, section 2.1.1)
However, the notion of how experience “seems” might alternatively be understood in 
line with N-IDEA1 – as how it is most natural for us to conceive of experience. We can 
then formulate two parallel transparency theses6:
WEAK CONCEPTIONAL TRANSPARENCY (WCT): If we pay attention to the phe-
nomenology of visual experience, there are bound to be some elements/features that 
we fi nd it very natural to conceive of as being apparently mind-independent features.
STRONG CONCEPTIONAL TRANSPARENCY (SCT): If we pay attention to the 
phenomenology of visual experience, every element/feature we could discover will be 
such that we fi nd it very natural to conceive of them all as being apparently mind-
independent features.
I claim we should prefer WCT/SCT to WPT/SPT. Why? 
3. A short story about Wittgenstein
Th ere is a well-known, though quite possibly apocryphal, anecdote involving Witt-
genstein. During some philosophical discussion a student of Wittgenstein (possibly 
Anscombe) is supposed to have remarked: “it doesn’t look like the earth is rotating”. 
Th e student thought she was stating something obvious and non-contentious. Wily 
old Wittgenstein, however, is supposed to have asked in response: “Well, how should a 
rotating earth look?” – his point being that as the earth does rotate, surely the way that 
things look is the way that a rotating earth, in fact, looks.
In the middle ages the following argument perhaps seemed persuasive:
(1) Th e way that the earth appears indicates (provides non-conclusive evidence) that 
the earth does not rotate.
(2) Th e earth is in fact the way that its appearance indicates.
So, (3) Th e earth does not rotate.
Someone defending the earth-rotating theory might accept premise 1 but reject prem-
ise 2. Th ey might allow that appearances are misleading – the earth is not in fact the 
way that its appearance suggests. Th is would be to concede that appearances weigh 
against their theory to some extent, but that the evidence of appearances is not deci-
sive. 
6 Once more, of course, SCT will, whereas WCT will not, have to face blurry-vision-style objections.
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Wittgenstein’s move in the story is to reject premise 1. Th e way that the earth appears 
does not indicate (provide evidence) that the earth does not rotate – it is only a wrong-
headed conception or background beliefs that leads us to infer non-rotation from the 
earth’s appearance. We might sympathise with mediaeval people erroneously taking 
the appearance of the earth to support non-rotation and to weigh against rotation, 
but we now realise that this way things look is in fact accounted for and explained by 
earth-rotation and so does not provide support for non-rotation. People in the mid-
dle-ages were not just wrong about whether the earth rotates, they were also wrong 
about the evidential bearing of the earth’s appearance on this astronomical question. 
Likewise, I suggest, it is wrong to claim that visual phenomenology itself, or mere in-
trospection of it, provides evidence against sense-data theories. For a question analo-
gous to Wittgenstein’s could be pressed: how should visual phenomenology be if, say, 
sense-data theories are correct? Consider an argument that might seem reasonable to a 
theorist who accepts N-IDEA 2:
(1*) Th e way that experience introspectively appears indicates that experience is not 
awareness of sense-data.
(2*) Experience is in fact the way that its introspective appearance indicates.
So, (3*) Experience is not awareness of sense-data.
Defenders of sense-data theories might try accepting 1* but rejecting 2*. So they would 
accept that the way experience introspectively appears is misleading; experience is not 
the way that is suggested by its introspective appearance. Th is would be to concede 
that introspection of experience does weigh against their theory but not decisively so. 
Th e parallel move to Wittgenstein’s in the story is to reject 1*. Th e way that experience 
introspectively appears does not indicate that sense-data are not involved7. 
Presumably no sense-data theorists take their theory to make claims or predictions 
that our visual experience should seem any way other than how it does seem to us. In 
the (unlikely) event that sense-data theories were shown defi nitively to be the correct 
theory of perceptual experience, we would presumably have to accept that such theo-
ries do in fact account perfectly well for our visual phenomenology. To put the same 
point another way: any theorist who wishes to claim that visual phenomenology in 
itself supports their particular theory should be able to say how visual phenomenology 
would be, how experience would seem diff erent to how it does seem, if some other the-
ory or model of visual experience were actually the case. Well, how would our visual 
phenomenology be in a possible world in which sense-data theories of visual experi-
ence were true? One might be tempted to think that experience would somehow be 
fl atter or cruder, like looking at a 2-d image or a mosaic – but this would be an unfair 
caricature of sense-data theories.
7 Notice, of course, that this is quite diff erent from claiming that the way experience introspectively appears indi-
cates that sense-data are involved. I have no wish to defend that claim!
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Of course, one might want to argue that although some theory about the nature/struc-
ture of conscious episodes claims that their proposed structure accounts well for our 
manifest phenomenology, the theory is not entitled to make such a claim. Th is is what 
I understand the standard kind of criticism of adverbialism to be – adverbialists want 
to claim that their proposed unitary structure has enough dimensions of variation to 
account for all of the varied phenomenology we enjoy, but adverbialism’s critics doubt 
that the proposed unitary structure does really provide the resources to account for 
our manifest phenomenology. But this is not the sort of criticism that can reasonably 
be levelled against sense-data theories. Once a theorist has posited an entire realm of 
non-environmental particulars and properties, it should be conceded that they have 
helped themselves to enough resources to account for our visual phenomenology. 
Sense-data are entities that are just stipulated to be such as to seem the way that experi-
ence does (introspectively) seem. Th e only reasonable way then to complain that visual 
experience “does not seem to be awareness of sense-data” is when “seem” is understood 
in accordance with N-IDEA 1) and not N-IDEA 2). 
4. Disagreeing about Phenomenology
Mike Martin8 has pointed out that there is something odd about the very idea of dis-
agreement over phenomenology. Phenomenology is supposed to be that which is just 
directly present to mind, something we are confronted with when we open our eyes, 
which simply stands revealed to our attention or introspection. So, assuming that dif-
ferent theorists don’t have markedly diff erent phenomenology, shouldn’t we expect 
them to agree as to what is just manifest when we pay attention to experience?
Nevertheless, the fact remains that there is disagreement about the manifest phenom-
enology of visual experience. For example, sense-data theorists are committed to their 
own rival thesis, which they take to be supported by mere theory-neutral introspec-
tion; a thesis that Martin usefully labels as “actualism”.
“Actualism requires that whatever qualities one senses, some actual instance of 
those qualities and the object which bears them must exist and be sensed.” (Martin, 
forthcoming)9
A well-known statement of actualism, together with the idea that its truth should be 
obvious once we merely attend to our own experience, comes from H.H. Price:
“When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt… One thing however that I 
cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, 
standing out from a background of other colour-patches… that something is red 
8 See section 6 of Chapter 1 of his forthcoming book “Uncovering appearances”. See also Spener, forthcoming.
9 Th is is similar to Robinson’s well known “Phenomenal Principle” (Robinson 1994, p.32)
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and round then and there I cannot doubt… that it now exists, and that I am 
conscious of it – by me at least who am conscious of it this cannot possibly be 
doubted…” (Price 1932, 3)
Despite Price’s repeated insistence to the contrary, actualism has been doubted, indeed 
it has been repudiated by theorists in the intentionalist school, who consider it a sort of 
fallacy. Intentionalists claim that things can appear red or brown, or circular or square, 
without there having to be any actual instance of such properties – all that is required 
is that my mental state, my experience, represents that those qualities exist in the envi-
ronment. Intentionalists then deny that visual phenomenology is such that mere intro-
spection reveals that it is constituted by actual quality instances. Th ey take actualism 
to be an erroneous theoretical commitment of the sense-data school, something that is 
not just “given in the given”.
Th us we have rival theorists disagreeing over theses that each rival claims to be just 
obviously true once we attend to our own experience10. Another example of disagree-
ment about the nature of visual phenomenology is the debate over whether causation 
is something that we genuinely experience. Hume, of course, denied that we do; but 
since the work of Michotte11 in the sixties many have come to argue that causation 
is experienced in the same way that movement and depth and shape and colour are 
experienced – e.g. Siegel 2005. Th at is, the appearance of causality is a genuinely phe-
nomenal feature just as the appearance of movement, shape and colour are. Berkeley12 
not only denied that we really experience 3-dimensional depth, he casually suggests 
this is something “agreed by all”. Some, e.g. Prichard13, have even denied that we really 
experience movement.
It is notable, however, that philosophers never deny that the appearance of colours and 
shapes are genuinely phenomenological features. I think it is fair to say then, in light of 
the disagreements between sense-data and intentionalist theorists, that neither mind-in-
dependent-ness nor actually-instantiated-ness are properties that are as straightforwardly 
phenomenal as shape and colour. To put the point in terms of representational content, an 
intentionalist faces the question: is mind-independence a property that our visual experi-
ence represents objects as having just as it represents their shape, colour, position etc? 
According to strong transparency, when we try to pay attention to experience all that 
we fi nd seem to be visible features of the objects of awareness. So then if apparent 
10 Martin (2004) argues that Naively direct realism is best placed to capture our natural/intuitive view of experi-
ence as, in the perceptual case at least, it can endorse both the theses of actualism and transparency. I would agree 
with Martin that both actualism and transparency are part of our natural conception of experience so long as we 
bear in mind that it is not just mere introspection that recommends these theses to us, but also, in Martin’s terms, 
“refl ection” upon our experience.
11 Michotte 1963
12 In his “New Th eory of Vision” (1709).
13 See Prichard, 1950.
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mind-independence is one of the phenomenal features of visual experience we discov-
er in this way, mind-independence must be a property of objects that is a sensible or 
visible property, just like an object’s shape or its colour etc. But do we really want to say 
that we can see an object’s mind-independence in the same way that we can see its size 
or its shape? Shift ing to weak transparency, we might try to maintain that the mind-
independence of the objects of awareness is a phenomenal property of experience but 
one that is not transparent – i.e. unlike shape and colour, paying attention to the ap-
parent mind-independence of the objects of awareness is not to pay attention to a fea-
ture of those objects of awareness, it is paying attention to a feature of experience itself, 
perhaps like blurriness is supposedly a feature of visual experience itself. But does this 
even make sense? Can it be an intrinsic feature of the act/faculty of awareness itself, as 
opposed to the objects of awareness, that the objects which the act/faculty is engaged 
with are mind-independent? Is it an introspectible quality of visual experience itself, 
separate from the qualities of any of the objects we are apparently presented with, that 
the experience is apparently latching onto mind-independent items?
Similar questions arise for the property of actuality if one is a Naively-direct theorist 
committed to both transparency and actualism. Is the, so to speak, actuality of an ob-
ject (as opposed to merely being some representational content) a property of it that 
forms part of the phenomenology of seeing it? To restate the general question, are ei-
ther actuality or mind-independence properties that form part of the visual appear-
ance of objects as we see them?
I have not, I confess, provided decisive arguments for giving negative answers to these 
questions. But I hope I have raised some problems for treating, in line with N-IDEA2, 
either mind-independence or “actuality” as genuinely visual-phenomenal properties 
on a par with shape, colour, movement etc.
As Spener (forthcoming) emphasises, the very existence of disagreement about our in-
trospectible phenomenology is problematic for any theorist who appeals to the deliv-
erances of introspection in support of some thesis. For such disagreement casts doubt 
on the trustworthiness of the introspective method, a method which is supposed to be 
easily employed by anyone and which is supposed to reveal shared phenomenologi-
cal features. In the face of such disagreement then, a theorist must try to explain away 
her opponent’s claims in such a way that the opponent’s introspective powers are not 
blamed, for this would be to cast doubt on the very method of introspecting one’s ex-
perience. Rather, the blame must be laid elsewhere. Th e plausible move here would be 
to suggest that one’s opponent’s introspective powers are working fi ne and revealing, in 
fact, just the same as one’s own introspection is, but that one’s opponent is failing to ac-
curately report, or is somehow misconceiving, their own introspected phenomenology 
due to some theory-led bias14
14 Note that for this move to be available, one must have a model of introspection that allows for there to be a 
gap between how one’s phenomenology, as correctly revealed by introspection, actually is and how one sincerely 
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5. Final dialectical remarks
I’ve argued that visual phenomenology in itself is neutral between the various compet-
ing theories – sense-data, intentionalism, naïve-realism – so that naïve-realism’s place 
as the natural starting point of the dialectic must be due to our natural way of con-
ceiving of experience. But then if all that can be said is that we tend to naturally think 
of experience as being the presentation of environmental mind-independent features, 
why should any weight be given to this natural tendency? Is there any good reason 
for wanting to avoid revising this natural view, or is it just innate prejudice to put the 
burden of proof onto the opposing theorists? Is our natural conception of experience a 
folk theory on a par with the non-rotating earth?
Diff erent proponents of the “relational” conception of experience have claimed diff er-
ent philosophical virtues for it. McDowell (2008) claims that certain epistemological 
benefi ts fl ow from accepting naïve-realism, whereas Putnam (1994) claims that it is 
important for cognitive science and for the mind-body problem. Campbell (2002) and 
Brewer (2005) both argue it is essential for an account of reference. Th ese are what you 
might call sophisticated reasons for being naïve. Th ey are hardly reasons that could 
be adduced for favouring “naïve” realism at the outset of philosophical inquiry. I have 
argued against the idea that one resource available to the non-philosophical naïf – the 
introspectible nature of experience – can (in itself) justify favouring naïve-realism over 
its rivals at the start of the debate (before arguments from illusion etc are invoked). But 
this leaves it open that there could be other reasons, perhaps reasons available to the 
naïve, in favour of their natural view of experience15.16
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